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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE DECISION TO WAIVE
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
United States v. Bland
No. 71-1761 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1972)
The defendant, a sixteen year old boy, was charged with armed rob-
bery. He was indicted as an adult pursuant to 16 District of Columbia
Code section 2301(3)(A), which excludes from the jurisdiction of the
Family Court individuals between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
charged with certain crimes.' The defendant moved to dismiss the in-
dictment, alleging that the statutory basis for trying him as an adult
denied him procedural due process. The district court granted this
motion, holding section 2301(3)(A) unconstitutional as an arbitrary
legislative classification. 2  The United States appealed. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held: A stat-
ute does not violate the federal Constitution because it gives the prose-
cutor discretionary power to deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction
over an individual by charging him with a certain crime.
The juvenile court system in the United States arose from a belief
that the treatment accorded children in the criminal system was harsh
and inequitable.4 The philosophy of the juvenile system emphasized
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3)(A) (Supp. IV, 1971):
The term "child" means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except
that the term "child" does not include an individual who is sixteen years of
age or older and-(A) charged by the United States Attorney with (i) mur-
der, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault
with attempt to commit any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause
(iii) and any other offense properly joinable with such an offense....
2. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1971).
3. United States v. Bland, No. 71-1761 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1972).
4. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CiuME & DnuIN-
QUENCY 97, 99 (1961). Professor Ketcham lists four major trends that led to the en-
actment of the first juvenile court act in Illinois:
1. The equitable concept of parens patriae;
2. The increased use of legislation to obtain humanitarian social ends;
3. The growing horror at the traditional judicial practice of treating children
over 7 as criminals; and
4. The mounting number of specialized correctional facilities for dealing with
children.
For further discussion on the evolution of juvenile courts, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
14 (1966); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909); Paulsen, Fairness
to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 547 (1957); Comment, Waiver of Jurisdic-
tion in Juvenile Court, 30 Oiuo ST. L.J. 132 (1969); The Philosophy and Theory of
the Juvenile Court, Original Concepts and Theories, 23 Juv. Or. J. 1, 4-7 (1972).
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the humanitarian policies of protection, understanding, and rehabilita-
tion ' rather than punishment and retribution.6  Juvenile court action
is more informal than criminal action and allows the court broad dis-
cretion in the decision-making process. 7  For these reasons juvenile
court action is considered "civil" rather than criminal,, and the applica-
tion of this "civil" action theory has been used to deny constitutional
rights to the juvenile.9
See .generally F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dux & R. PARNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AD-
MINISTRATION AND RELATED PROCESSES 1157-1223 (1971).
5. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Mack, supra note 4, at 119-20; Paulsen, supra note 4, at 547-48;
The Philosophy and Theory of the Juvenile Court, Original Concepts and Theories,
23 Juv. Cr. J. 1 (1972).
6. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1966); THE CHALLENGE OF CRIMB IN A
FREE SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 79-80 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION]; Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. REv. 167, 170-73; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN.
L. REv. 547-48 (1957).
7. PRESIDENT'S COMMnSSION 79-80:
They differ from adult criminal courts in a number of basic respects, re-
flecting the philosophy that erring children should be protected and rehabili-
tated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system. Thus
they substitute procedural informality for the adversary system, emphasize
investigation of the juvenile's background in deciding dispositions, rely heavily
on social sciences for both diagnosis and treatment, and are committed to
rehabilitation of the juvenile as the predominant goal of the juvenile system.
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 75 (1966) (concurring opinion); Paulsen, Kent v.
U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 173.
Juvenile court statutes are said to be based on the state's power as parens patriae.
Parens patriae is a "doctrine of the English Court of Chancery by which the King,
through his chancellors, assumed the general protection of all infants in the realm."
Ketcham, supra note 4, at 97. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1941); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); Antieau, Constitutional
Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. REv. 387 (1966); Furlong, The Juvenile
Court and the Lawyer, 3 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1963); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offcndei, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957); Rubin, Protecting the Child in Juvenile Court,
43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 425 (1952); Comment, Juvenile Courts-Juvenile Delinquent
Entitled to Hearing on Question of Waiver of Jurisdiction, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1385-86
(1966).
8. See, eg., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (App. A);
Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Comment, Juvenile
Courts-luvenile Delinquent Entitled to Hearing on Question of Waiver of Jurisdiction,
19 VAND. L. REv. 1385-86 (1966).
9. Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 167, 173:
The aim of the criminal process is the imposition of stigma and pain for the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/6
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Recently the juvenile justice system has come under attack1" because
it has allegedly failed to deal effectively with juvenile crime.11 Fur-
thermore, it has often failed to provide the juvenile with the protective,
understanding treatment for which it was designed, while at the same
time being harsher in its application than its philosophy would indi-
cate. 2 Therefore, with the emphasis on practical problems rather than
social ideals, the courts have begun to apply basic constitutional rights
to the juvenile court system.' 3 At the same time the courts have ex-
pressed a desire to retain the juvenile court's uniqueness in the belief
that its rehabilitative processes do reach and benefit some juvenile of-
fenders. 14
purposes of punishment, deterrence, or reformation. The aims of the newjuvenile process were protection, education, and salvation. . . . To such
beneficient purposes constitutional guarantees had little or nothing to con-
tribute.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966);
Comment, Juvenile Courts-Juvenile Delinquent Entitled to Hearing on Question of
Waiver of Jurisdiction, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1385-86 (1966). See generally Pee v.
United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (App. B).
10. "There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18
(1966); Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
Wis. L. Rev. 7.
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-907, in D.C. CoDE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRA-
"iVE SERvICE 444 (1971); Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Senate Committee on the
District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1800-1810 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
20 n.26 (1966).
12. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 80:
The limitations both in theory and execution, of strictly rehabilitative treat-
ment methods, combined with public anxiety over the seemingly irresistible
rise in juvenile criminality, have produced a rupture between the theory and
practice of juvenile court disposition. While statutes, judges, and commenta-
tors still talk the language of compassion and treatment, it has become clear
that in fact the same purposes that characterized the use of the criminal law
for adult offenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are
involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders too.
13. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966); Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
Sup. Cr. REV. 167; The Constitution, Due Process and Changing Times, 23 Juv. Cr.
J. 1, 12-16 (1972).
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1966); Schorhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 592-96 (1968).
One basis for the belief that the waiver proceeding, a procedure to determine
whether a child should be tried as a juvenile or transferred to the criminal court and
tried as an adult, is a critically important stage is an understanding that the juvenile
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Juveniles considered beyond the rehabilitative processes of the juve-
nile justice system create a very special problem. Juvenile court statutes
traditionally have dealt with this problem by creating a waiver of juris-
diction procedure" that enables the juvenile court to transfer certain
individuals to the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court. 16
In Kent v. United States11 the United States Supreme Court placed
court system does offer benefits that do not exist in the criminal court system. In fact
many state statutes have made the waiver decision depend upon the criteria of whether
the juvenile under consideration is amenable to the special rehabilitative processes of
the juvenile courts. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1971); CAL. WF..LF. & INST'NS
CODE § 707 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. 2151.26 (Supp. 1971).
15. Sargeant & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction-An Evaluation of the Process in
Juvenile Court, 9 CRiME & DELINQUENCY 121, 122-24 (1963). The authors list
three ieasons given for waiver of jurisdiction: (1) some children are not really chil-
dren; (2) certain cases are "hopeless"; (3) the lack of facilities.
For other sources dealing with the philosophy of the waiver procedure, see Harris v.
United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Burd, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile
Court: Another Gault Question Still Unanswered, 15 S.D.L. REv. 376 (1970); Paulsen,
Kent v. U.S.: Tie Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REV.
167, 182; Schornhorst, supra note 14; Comment, Separating tie Criminal from tile
Delinquent: Due Process in Certification Procedure, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1968).
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1959); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1971);
Mo. REV. STAT. 211.071 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1971).
The Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), dealt with the
former District of Columbia waiver provisions in D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961):
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which
would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any other child charged
with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life
imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and
order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult ....
Alternatively, statutes may either extend concurrent jurisdiction to the criminal court,
e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 232.62 (1969), or under some circumstances grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the criminal court, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3103 & 9-3204 (Supp.
1972).
17, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Much controversy has arisen concerning whether the decision in Kent rested on a
puiely statutory or on a constitutional basis. Judge Wright in his dissenting opinion
in United States v. Bland, No. 71-1761 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1972), emphatically states
that Kent was based on constitutional grounds.
For sources stating Kent was based on statutory grounds, see, e.g., United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Stanley v. Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 209
(W.D. Va. 1968); People v. Handley, 51 111. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972); People
v. Bombacino, 51 Il. 2d 17, 28 N.E.2d 697 (1972); State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119,
428 P.2d 658 (1967); Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167; Comment, Juvenile Court-The District of Columbia
Waiver of Jursidiction Statute--Statutory Due Process-Constitutional Law, 12 How.
L.J. 360 (1966); Comment, Separating the Criminal from the Delinquent: Due Process
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/6
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certain procedural safeguards on the waiver proceedings in the District
of Columbia in an attempt to limit arbitrary and indiscriminate de-
cision-making.'8 The Court held that the traditionally informal "civil"
nature of juvenile court proceedings must be amended at this "criti-
cally important' 9 stage to provide for a hearing, access by the juve-
nile's counsel to social records, and a statement of reasons for the
juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction.2"
Four years after Kent, Congress reformed the court system in the
District of Columbia.2' In addition to a reformed juvenile waiver pro-
in Certification Procedure, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 158 (1968); 52 A.B.A.J. 476 (1966).
For sources stating Kent was based on constitutional grounds, see, e.g., Strickland
v. United States, 449 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion); Brown
v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967); 52 IowA L. Ruv.
139 (1966).
Many court decisions have held that Kent and In re Gault, taken together, form a
constitutional imperative as to juvenile waiver proceedings. See, e.g., Powell v. Hocker,
453 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
18. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-64 (1966). See note 16 supra for
the text of the statute. Many states have reformed their juvenile statutes to conform to
the Kent standards. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (1971); Wis. STAT. § 48.18
(Supp. 1972).
19. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). See Black v. United States,
355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watkins v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1964). The court in Kent emphasized the different consequences of a conviction be-
fore a criminal court rather than before a juvenile court. Under D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3202 (Supp. IV, 1971), the penalty for armed robbery may include a sentence up
to thirty years. Under D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320 (Supp. IV, 1971), the dispositions
for a finding of delinquency include: permission to remain with his parents; placement
under protective supervision; transfer to legal custody of a public agency; or probation.
20. Some judicial decisions and authors have emphasized that certain standards
must guide the determination of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. These standards
emerge from juvenile court philosophy and the particular statute under consideration.
In Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court stated:
Particularly vexing are the problems presented by the sixteen or seventeen
year old adolescents precocious in criminal propensity. The problem of
which of them should be waived is of such breadth and complexity that the
responsibility for the waiver determination was deliberately assigned to the
judge of the Juvenile Court and not to the prosecutorial arm of government.
The "full investigation" by the judge, specified in the statute [D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-914 (1961)], is not confined to an awareness of the offense at
hand, but includes evaluation of the juvenile and his record, made by thejudge with the benefit of the contribution of assistants with special background
in the social sciences.
See, e.g., Croxton, The Kent Case and Its Consequence, 7 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1967);
Schornhorst, supra note 14; Committee on the Standard Juvenile Court Act of the Na-
tional Probation and Parole Association, 5 N.P.P.A.J. 353 (1959).
21. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cedure,'-"' the jurisdiction of the new Family Court was altered by a
change in the definition of the term "child. '23  This reformation, in ef-
fect, granted exclusive and original jurisdiction to the criminal court
over individuals who were previously subject to the waiver proceedings
of the juvenile court.-4  The United States Attorney's decision25 to
charge a person with an enumerated offense became the deciding fac-
tor in determining whether an individual would receive the "care and
rehabilitation" of the juvenile court or the "punitive measures" of the
criminal court.26
L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (pertinent provisions codified at D.C. CODE
ANN. ch. 23 (Supp. IV, 1971) ).
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (Supp. IV, 1971).
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 (Supp. IV, 1971). Section 16-2301 was enacted
"[blecause of the great increase in the number of serious felonies committed by juve-
niles and because of the substantial difficulties in transferring juvenile offenders
charged with serious felonies to the jurisdiction of the adult court under present law.
." H. REP. No. 91-907, in D.C. CODE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMImSTRATvE SERVICE
446 (1971).
See Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1800-1810 (1969); Darling, Youthful Offenders and Neglected
Children Under the D.C. Crime Act, 20 AM. U.L. REV. 373 (1971); Lawton, Juvenile
Proccedings-The New Look, 20 AM. U.L. REv. 342 (1971).
24. In this respect the D.C. Code is not unlike many state statutes that limit the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02
(Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-2, 49-4-3 (Supp. 1972). In dealing with
the Indiana statute, the court in Riner v. State, 281 N.E.2d 815, 817 (Ind. 1972), stated:
Appellants next claim error because the prescriptions of In re Gault. . .and
Kent v. United States ...were not followed in this case. Appellants' con-
tention is properly disposed of upon the reflection that this was not a juvenile
trial in a juvenile court. Instead, the original jurisdiction was in the Circuit
Court. Jurisdiction in the juvenile court exists only in cases where a juvenile
"commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment." (our emphasis). Burns' Ind. Stat.
Anno. § 9-3204(1) (1971 Supp.).
See, eog., United States ex rel. Walken v. Maroney, 444 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States exv rel. Imel v. Municipal Court, 225 Ind. 23, 72 N.E.2d 357 (1947); Mason v.
Henderson, 337 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. La. 1972); Walker v. State, 235 So. 2d 714 (Miss.
1970).
25. A few courts have considered the issue of prosecutorial discretion in the
uaixer procedure or the determination of jurisdiction. See Mason v. Henderson, 337
F. Supp. 35 (E.D. La. 1972); United States v. Alexander, 333 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C.
1971); People v. Handley, 51 111. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972); People v. Carlson,
108 I11. App. 2d 463, 247 N.E.2d 919 (1969); De Backer v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 352,
175 N.W.2d 912 (1970); Lehmann v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 87 Nev. 24, 480
P.2d 155 (1971). See also F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: TAE DECISION TO CHARGE A
SUsPECT WrrH A CRIME (1969); Paulsen, supra note 4, at 553; Schornhorst, supra
note 14, at 598-99.
26. The majority and dissent disagreed in United States v. Bland over whether the
charge from the United States Attorney determined the court of original jurisdiction or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/6
442 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Traditionally, once a suspect is arrested, the decision whether to
charge lies primarily with the prosecutor. In addition to screening the
sufficiency of the evidence, the prosecutor is expected to individualize
justice and to consider several factors in making his decision to prose-
cute: the limited resources of the criminal justice system; public opin-
ion; the willingness of the victim to prosecute; judicial attitudes on the
propriety of prosecuting certain crimes; and police efforts.2 7 Since the
prosecutor alone must weigh these various factors, his discretion in the
charging is very broad.
Recognizing this reasoning, the majority in Bland agreed with the
government that the procedural requirements of Kent need not apply,
since the prosecutor traditionally has been permitted to make charging
decisions that have serious consequences. 2  The court stated that judi-
cial interference with prosecutorial discretion was rare and existed only
when the prosecutor acted arbitrarily. The majority also accepted the
government's argument that the procedural standards enumerated in
Kent were inapplicable since section 2301(3)(A) is a purely jurisdic-
tional statute and does not involve a question of waiver.20
Judge Wright, dissenting on both points, argued that the prosecutor's
decision to charge a juvenile, thus determining the court of jurisdiction,
is unlike a traditional charging decision. He contended that the juve-
nile charging decision was essentially a waiver decision and, since Kent
demanded that due process standards be followed in the judicial waiver
decision, these standards are even more necessary if the decision is
made by the less neutral prosecutor.30 Judge Wright's dissenting opin-
ion also emphasized that the decision to subject the juvenile to the juris-
diction of the adult court has such severe consequences that the de-
cision is, in substance, the critically important stage that Kent meant to
removed the jurisdiction from the juvenile court. For a discussion of this issue, see
generally Darling, supra note 23, at 381-82; Lawton, supra note 23, at 346-50.
27. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: Tim DECISION TO C ARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1969); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J.
Comp. L. 532 (1970). See also F. MiLL'ER, R. DAWSON, G. DIX & R. PARNAS, CRIMi-
NAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED PRoCnssEs 531-611 (1971).
28. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v.
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,
171 (5th Cir. 1965).
29. See note 24 supra.
30. The Illinois waiver statute provides an interesting example of procedural
checks on prosecutorial discretion in the waiver proceeding. Waiver of juvenile juris-
diction is determined by the state's attorney unless the juvenile judge objects. 37 ILL.
ANN. STAT. § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
[Vol. 1973:436
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protect." Therefore, the constitutional standards32 of Kent must ap-
ply, regardless of how section 2301(3)(A) is labeled.
Although Judge Wright's argument apparently is not based on an
absolute right to treatment for the juvenile,33 he does seem to say that
when the legislature gives someone 4 the discretion to determine
whether certain individuals are subject to the jurisdiction of the adult
criminal court, procedural safeguards must be placed on the exercise
of that discretion. 35
It may be argued that the determination whether an individual is
31. For an interesting case revealing some of the problems that arise from allow-
ing prosecutorial discretion in the Nevada certification procedure, see Lehmann v.
Warden, Nevada State Prison, 87 Nev. 24, 27, 480 P.2d 155, 156 (1971), in which the
court stated:
In this case Lehmann was 17 years of age when indicted by the grand jury on
the open charge of murder, which is a capital offense. There was no need
for certification by the juvenile court. Lehmann argues now that such a cer-
tification became necessary once the district attorney filed the information
charging second degree murder. We do not agree. Admittedly, the cer-
tification proceeding is mandatory in all cases of juveniles except capital
cases. Second degree murder is not a capital offense, and a certification
would have been required if Lehmann had been initially so indicted by the
grand jury. The district attorney should not have filed an information in
this case. The court procedure would have been to follow NRS § 174.420,
sub-section 2, which permitted a defendant accused of murder to plead to the
lesser degree with consent of the district attorney and approval of the district
judge. Although the procedure selected was wrong, the effect was the same
as though the correct method had been followed, and we find the procedural
error harmless.
32. See cases cited note 17 supra.
33. Judge Wright stated in the beginning of his dissenting opinion that Kent
"held, in unmistakable terms, that before a child under 18 can be tried in adult court
the Constitution requires a hearing 'sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy
the basic requirements of due process and fairness . . . .'" This statement appears
overbroad, for nowhere in the Constitution do people under 18 receive special mention.
Further, the first juvenile statute was adopted in the 1890's, and no amendment con-
ceming juveniles has been added to the Constitution since the juvenile court's inception.
34. Judge Wright conceded that Congress could shift the waiver decision from the
juvenile judge to the United States Attorney. It is uncertain why he chose not to
challenge the prosecutor's authority to make such a decision. In Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor could not
initiate the issuance of a warrant, for due process required that such a procedure be
handled by an impartial magistrate. Constitutional control of warrant proceedings is
included in the fourth amendment. The waiver decision, however, is governed by the
more general constitutional requirements of due process, and Judge Wright may have
felt that these general requirements could not serve as a basis for a requirement of
neutrality.
35. This procedural right may be a constitutional right, especially in light of the
decisions in Kent and In re Gault.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/6
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amenable to the juvenile rehabilitative processes, a decision normally
made at the waiver hearing, has been previously made by the legisla-
ture. In the instant case this would mean that Congress has decided
that persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen who have com-
mitted certain crimes are not amenable, and all that remains is a deter-
mination whether the person has committed the offenses. The prose-
cutor, however, could easily circumvent this legislative determination
by charging only those juveniles, otherwise covered by section 2301,
whom he personally considers unamenable to rehabilitation in the ju-
venile process. On the other hand, he could, rather than charging
those he considers amenable, file a delinquency petition against them
in juvenile court or merely refer them to the proper juvenile authorities.
In effect, the prosecutor's discretion still controls the waiver decision,
and, according to Judge Wright's analysis, the need for due process
safeguards remains compelling.
Judge Wright's arguments appear persuasive, and his attempt to
place procedural safeguards on discretionary waiver decisions is desira-
ble. His analysis, however, does not preclude a legislative determina-
tion of non-amenability. A statute could be drafted which would ac-
complish this objective and yet satisfy the due process requirements
urged by Judge Wright. Such a statute would have to determine juve-
nile versus criminal treatment on the basis of conduct rather than the
crime charged. The statute would have to exclude from the juvenile
court's jurisdiction conduct which would constitute one of the statu-
torily enumerated offenses despite the prosecutor's failure to charge
such an offense. 30
36. For example, a statute that may fit these qualifications is IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-3103 & 9-3204 (Supp. 1972).
§ 9-3103 The juvenile courts . . . shall have original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion... in all cases in which a child is alleged to be a delinquent.
§ 9-3204 The words "delinquent child" shall include any boy under the full
age of eighteen [18] years and any girl under the full age of
eighteen [18] years who: (1) Commits an act which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or
life imprisonment ....
Though the Indiana statute does not explicitly limit the juvenile court's jurisdiction in
the suggested manner, it is more susceptible to such an interpretation than the statute
in Bland. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, H9 921 & 938 (Supp. 1972).
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